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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS:  A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY ON THE ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH KOREA BASED ON THE INFRASCOPE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
By  
 
 
Mary Grace Robles Flores 
 
 
In the hope of achieving sustainable implementation of Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) programs in the Philippines, this paper makes a comparative study on the road 
infrastructure development in the Philippines and South Korea by comparing the Daang Hari-
South Luzon Expressway Link Road project with the successfully built, operated and 
transferred Incheon Bridge (also known as the Incheon Songdo Highway project), using the 
Asia Infrascope Framework.  This paper submits that if a PPP project satisfies the Asia 
Infrascope criteria, the more likely it is to become more sustainable.  Hypothetically, the 
infrastructure project outcomes should be positive in terms of public satisfaction, quality, 
financial returns, and regulatory/audit evaluations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The significance of infrastructure for developing countries cannot be underestimated 
since it is regarded as the most important catalyst for economic growth, development and 
poverty reduction.  The insufficiency in roads/bridges, public transportation, energy and 
water services, for example, can negatively impinge on the advancement of subsisting 
businesses and may similarly prevent the advent of new competitors.  An effective and well-
organized communication and transportation infrastructure offers a complete mobility for 
people and commodities alike, plays a critical role in the decrease of input and transaction 
costs and boosts market competence.  Regional infrastructure which may have considerable 
overrun results drives regional fiscal movements while the system characteristics of 
infrastructure increases the connectivity of regions and encourages domestic integration. 
 However, an infrastructure development project is a complex undertaking.  It is large 
in scale; it requires a huge amount of financial resources; it demands a multi-faceted portfolio 
of technologies and skilled human resources; and it is prone to market failure since the return 
on investment takes a long time and is very uncertain. 
 Despite these challenges and the ambiguity that currently exists in the Philippines’ 
public-private partnership (PPP) approach to efficient and transparent implementation of the 
necessary legal and administrative framework of PPP agreements, the Philippine Government 
still chose to focus on a PPP model for infrastructure creation for the country’s much needed 
public policy innovation.  The reason for this decision is the fact that the PPP approach has 
been in trend for over a decade in the country and a large body of literature subsists on what 
comprises PPP in terms of ownership of assets, responsibility, operation, and maintenance. 
 For a variety of reasons, not all PPP projects are considered successful.  The most 
common for these projects’ failures stem from the problems of principal-agent relation, and it 
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is therefore credible to say that a PPP project’s success depends on how the principal (the 
Government) manages the endless contingencies, expected and unexpected, extant in the life 
of a PPP. 
 In order to help nations plan and manage prospective and existing PPP projects 
successfully, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), commissioned by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), has advanced an evaluation framework for PPP projects with a 
critical list of success criteria.  The Asia Infrascope is a benchmark index and learning tool 
that assesses countries’ readiness and capacity for sustainable, long-term PPP projects.   
 Recently, the current Philippine Administration has embarked on a PPP project to 
build a four-kilometer (km.) highway which is projected to be in operation by middle of 2014, 
while the South Korean Government has completed in 2009 its longest bridge (21.38 km.) 
that was recorded in history as a world-class PPP project. 
 In this study, my objective is to compare the Daang Hari-South Luzon Expressway 
(SLEx) Link Road project, which is an ongoing Philippine PPP project, with the Incheon 
Bridge project (also known as the Incheon Songdo Highway project) of South Korea in light 
of the Infrascope framework. 
 My hypothesis in this research is if a PPP project satisfies the Infrascope criteria, the 
more likely it is to become more sustainable than a PPP project that does not satisfy the 
framework.  And if this hypothesis is true, then the infrastructure project outcomes should be 
positive in terms of public satisfaction, quality, financial returns, and regulatory/audit 
evaluations. 
 The subsequent sections of this paper shall review the structure and general 
framework of PPP infrastructure projects and shall also focus on the experiences of both the 
Philippines and South Korea with the PPP approach for road infrastructure development, 
highlighting the cases of the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road and Incheon Bridge projects.  The 
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following sections shall provide an overview of the Infrascope framework for evaluating PPP 
projects; a comparative analysis; key discussions; and the summary and conclusion. 
 
 
II. The Structure of PPP Projects 
 
 According to ADB (PPP Handbook, 2008), the term public-private partnership 
describes a range of possible relationships among public and private entities in the context of 
infrastructure and other services.  PPPs present a framework that—while engaging the private 
sector—acknowledge and structure the role for government in ensuring that social obligations 
are met and successful sector reforms and public investments are achieved.  A strong PPP 
allocates the tasks, obligations, and risks among the public and private partners in an optimal 
way.  The public partners in a PPP are government entities, including ministries, departments, 
municipalities, or state-owned enterprises.  The private partners can be local or international 
and may include businesses or investors with technical or financial expertise relevant to the 
project.  Increasingly, PPPs may also include non-government organizations and/or 
community-based organizations that represent stakeholders directly affected by the project.  
 Effective PPPs recognize that the public and the private sectors each have certain 
advantages, relative to the other, in performing specific tasks.  The Government’s 
contribution to a PPP may take the form of capital for investment (available through tax 
revenue), a transfer of assets, or other commitments or in-kind contributions that support the 
partnership.  The Government also provides social responsibility, environmental awareness, 
local knowledge, and an ability to mobilize political support.  The private sector’s role in the 
partnership is to make use of its expertise in commerce, management, operations, and 
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innovation to run the business efficiently.  The private partner may also contribute investment 
capital depending on the form of contract. 
 Normally, PPPs are structured to distribute risks between the associates who are most 
capable to handle those risks and thus reduce costs while enhancing performance. 
 PPP can play a significant role in infrastructure provision and development.  Several 
countries have successfully used the Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach, a particular 
form of PPP to address the infrastructure needs of the economy, (UNIDO 1996).  With BOT, 
the private sector takes care of the design, financing, construction, operation and management 
of the infrastructural facility and after a specified concession period, the Government 
assumes ownership of the facility; the private sector takes on long-term risks of financing and 
managing an infrastructural facility in exchange for commercial returns to the investment 
under the user-pays principle (Menheere and Pollalis, 1986; Handley 1997, among others). 
 
II-1. A General Framework for PPP on Infrastructure Projects 
 
 An extensive variety of PPP models has surfaced.  These models differ mainly by 
ownership of capital assets, responsibility for investment, assumption of risks, and duration 
of contract.  The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) classified the PPP models into five wide categories in order of amplified 
participation and assumption of risks by the private sector.  These are:  (1) supply and 
management contracts, (2) turnkey contracts, (3) leases, (4) concessions, and (5) private 
finance initiative and private ownership.  
The basic features of these five categories of PPP models are shown in Figure 1. 
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Every one of these five categories has numerous variations.  A classification of the 
PPP models alongside their core qualities is shown in Table 1.   
While the scale of models shown in the table is potential as individual options, 
groupings are also possible such as, a lease or (partial) privatization contract for existing 
facilities which incorporates provisions for expansion through BOT.  As a matter of fact, 
many PPP schemes in the past five years are of combination type. 
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Every type has its own advantages and disadvantages and would be appropriate for 
attaining the main purpose of PPP to a different level.  In choosing the appropriateness of a 
specific model of PPP, special characteristics of some sectors and their technological 
development, legal and regulatory regimes, and public and political perception about the 
services in a sector may also be key aspects. 
  
* Build-Lease-Transfer is a variant. 
** BOT has many other variants such as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and 
Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT). 
  
*** The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model has many other names. In some cases, asset ownership may be 
transferred to, or retained by the public sector. 
  
There is no particular PPP scheme that can comply with all the requirements relating 
to a project’s location and its technical and financial features.  Selection of the most 
appropriate type should consider the country’s political, legal and socio-cultural 
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circumstances, maturity of the country’s PPP market, and the financial and technical features 
of the projects and sectors concerned. 
 As an illustration, for a new venture, a PFI or BOO type of models may be more 
suitable in a developing/untested market; while a BOT type of model may be more 
appropriate in a matured PPP market.  
 
 
III. PPP in the Philippines 
 
 To provide the legal framework governing financing, construction, and operation of 
an infrastructure project by a private entity (concessionaire), the Philippines enacted Republic 
Act (R.A.) No. 6957, which was later amended by R.A. No. 7718 in 1994. This made the 
Philippines the first country in Southeast Asia to enact a BOT law.  The contract with the 
Government specifies a period of time during which the Government delegates to the 
concessionaire the authority to finance, build and operate a facility and to impose charges or 
fees on users of the facility for a profit cooperation period. This is called the cooperation 
period.  At the end of the cooperation period, the private investor turns over or transfers the 
facility to the Government. 
 The Philippine BOT Law has been studied and used as a model for other BOT laws in 
neighboring countries because the BOT and its variant schemes has been widely used to 
apply private sector management and technical expertise and financing on infrastructure 
provision that would have otherwise not been provided because of the country’s capital 
shortage and inability to finance the much-needed infrastructure, and the notorious 
inefficiency of operation of infrastructure by the Government. The Philippine Government 
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entered into BOT contracts with the private sector in water supply, urban rail transit, 
international airport terminal services and toll roads. 
 
III-1. The Case of Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road Project 
 
 The Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road project is one of the Philippine Government’s 
priority PPP under its PPP Program launched by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III in 
November 2010. 
 The road project, which is a strategic component of the Metro Manila Expressway 
System, is located in one of the fastest developing parts in Metro Manila where increase in 
population, together with commercial and industrial progress, has caused severe traffic jam in 
the vicinity.  The said undertaking is proposed to deliver a high-standard expressway that 
would aid in a well-organized course of present and future traffic to and from Bacoor, Cavite 
and SLEx. 
 The construction of a new four-km., four-lane toll road started in February 2012 from 
the junction of Daang Reyna and Daang Hari in Las Piñas, Metro Manila and Bacoor, Cavite 
to SLEx through the Susana Heights Interchange in Muntinlupa, passing through the New 
Bilibid Prison (NBP) Reservation.  The projected link-road will utilize the Susana Heights 
Interchange as exit and entry from north and south of SLEx and will incorporate the building 
of a new bridge/expansion of the existing bridge traversing SLEx, as well as the broadening 
of the Susana Heights toll plaza (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2. Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road Project Map 
 
   
    
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 The Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road will also improve the master plan for restoration of 
the present NBP compound.  A proposal to restore the NBP and to transfer the location of the 
prison is in progress and the current setting is designed to be upgraded into a diverse business, 
institution and suburban estate.  With the construction of the thoroughfare, access to that part 
of the Metro will greatly improve, not to mention the economic benefit from savings in time 
and fuel. 
 The PPP Center of the Philippines estimated the construction cost based on the 
following factors:  (1) unit price of similar Philippine Government and BOT projects 
implemented or tendered from 2010-2011; and (2) procedures and composition for the 
derivation of base construction cost, in similar projects were used. 
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Figure 3. Layout of the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual Construction Site 
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 The total project cost is approximately PhP1.956 billion (US$47.413 million) 
inclusive of right of way (ROW) acquisition cost estimated at PhP177 million (US$4.290 
million). 
 
 
IV. PPP in South Korea  
 
 The Republic of Korea, with its 15-year experience in PPP program, is believed to 
have instituted an organizational background and a well-developed market.  The Korean 
Government instigates different forms of strategies that may aid infrastructure financing 
through PPP schemes.  Complete and explicit description of the PPP procurement steps—to 
protect or improve value for money—in the special law and regulations has been an 
important factor to advance efficiency and consistency and to lessen ambiguity in realizing 
PPP ventures in the country. 
 Since 1999, South Korea has had umbrella PPP legislation via the Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Act, which was restructured in 2005 to allow the Built-
Transfer-Lease (BTL) models, as well as schemes in a more extensive range.  The entire PPP 
method is supervised by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), with the Private 
Infrastructure Investment Management Centre (PIMAC) supporting in an advisory and 
guideline-drawing capacity.  PIMAC has set up steadily followed procedures for value for 
money (VFM) testing, proposal-preparation, tender-evaluation, and standard concession 
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agreements.  Potential projects costing over KRW50 billion (US$48 million) is put through 
an initial review, with either PIMAC (in the case of voluntary assignments) or the appropriate 
bureau (for requested works, later reviewed by PIMAC) performing VFM tests. 
 
 
IV-1. Incheon Bridge (Incheon Songdo Highway Project) in South Korea 
 
 The Incheon Bridge, which connects the Incheon International Airport (based on 
Yeongjong Island) and the international business district of New Songdo City (second bridge 
crossing), began construction in June 2005. 
 The bridge was finished and opened for public use in October 2009.  It is one of the 
seven longest bridges of its class in the world and was recorded in history as a world-
renowned bridge that gave various lessons on world-class financing technique, advanced 
project management, and comprehensive state-of-the-art bridge technologies.  The Incheon 
Bridge project became the first Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) project led by a 
foreign company.  It is a fine example of a successful venture that was carried out by deriving 
consensus from local societies. 
 
Figure 4. Overall View of Incheon Bridge 
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Figure 5. Layout of Incheon Bridge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The bridge (see Figure 6 below) is an 18.43 km. toll bridge that links the Seoul-
Incheon expressway with the Seohaean expressway, to cut down travel time from Incheon 
airport to the metropolitan districts of Seoul by 40 minutes.  The bridge was constructed at an 
approximation of more than KRW2.450 billion (US$1.4 billion). 
 
Figure 6. Incheon Bridge Project Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 KODA Development is a joint venture between UK-based AMEC and the City of 
Incheon.  It is in charge of the financing and managing of the PPP project; while Samsung 
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Joint Venture, a group of seven domestic builders, were responsible for the design and actual 
construction of the bridge. 
 KODA Development will run the bridge for 30 years and will later turn it over to the 
South Korean Government.  AMEC is the first foreign investor to head a major PPP scheme 
in South Korea.  It has a preliminary contract for seven years to operate and maintain the 
bridge in addition to a return on its investment.  AMEC’s equity investment totals US$38 
million (£21 million), representing a 23% interest in KODA Development. 
 AMEC’s original input has subsidized the primary blueprint and initial construction 
efforts on the project.  The residual debt and equity was given by an association of South 
Korean banks headed by Kookmin Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea, along with the 
Incheon Bridge Investment Company, which is owned by the Macquarie Bank of Australia 
(AU$86 million) and will hold 41% interest in KODA and debt of AU$354 million.   
 
 
V. A Framework for Evaluating PPP Projects 
 
 According to the ADB and The Economist’s EIU, the Asia Infrascope scores aspects 
of the regulatory and institutional frameworks, project experience and successes, the 
investment climate and the financial facilities in 11 developing countries in the Asia-Pacific, 
four benchmark countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea and United Kingdom) and one state 
(Gujarat, India).  The research also involves in-depth industry analysis, interviews with 
country and regional field experts and secondary investigation. 
 This thesis shall, however, focus only on the Infrascope results of the Philippines and 
South Korea. 
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 In the Asia Infrascope, the categories that make up the overall index isolate critical 
aspect of the PPP value chain, starting at project conception and spanning contract-design, 
bidding, enforcement, supervision, termination and financing.  The index specifically 
evaluates readiness and capacity by dividing the PPP project life-cycle into five components:  
(1) a country’s legal and regulatory framework for concession projects; (2) the design and 
responsibilities of institutions that prepare, award and oversee projects (institutional 
framework); (3) the government’s ability to uphold laws and regulations for concessions, as 
well as the number and success rate of past projects (operational maturity); (4) the business, 
political, and social environment for investment (investment climate); and (5) the financial 
facilities for funding infrastructure.  In addition, to recognize the significance of activity 
occurring at the regional level, a stand-alone sixth category and indicator for sub-national 
PPPs was added in 2010 (sub-national adjustment factor).  Several of the indicators that 
compose the index are based on quantitative data, which have been drawn from international 
statistical sources.  The others are qualitative in nature and have been produced by EIU.  
Many of these focus on legal and regulatory factors and are informed by publicly available 
information and interviews with sector and country experts.  In the absence of data, the 
Infrascope employs qualitative measures that obtain some elements of these important factors. 
 The Infrascope index consists of 19 indicators, of which 15 are qualitative and four 
quantitative.  Figures for the “quantitative indicators” are derived from the World Bank (WB) 
and the PPI Advisory Facility database and from the EIU’s Risk Briefing service.  Disparities 
in the quantitative data have been plugged in by estimates. 
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Figure 7. PPP Models:  Infrascope Focus 
 
The grading of qualitative indicators was enlightened by an array of key origins 
(government websites, legal texts, interviews and press reports), secondary information and 
statistical records were modified by the EIU.  The core bases applied in the index are the 
Transparency International, EIU and WB. 
  
 
 
VI. Analysis 
 
 An overview based on significant components of the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road 
and Incheon Bridge (see Table 2 below) is presented in this section to facilitate comparison 
of the two infrastructures. 
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 Moreover, the overall results of the Asia Infrascope as of June 2011 shall also be 
provided to further substantiate my claim regarding the performances of the Philippines and 
South Korea in terms of their PPP approaches. 
 And finally, I will provide a comparison using six of the Infrascope’s critical criteria, 
for brevity, between the two subject infrastructures.  
 
 
VI-1. A Comparison between the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road Project in the 
Philippines and the Incheon Bridge in South Korea 
 
Table 2 
Components 
Incheon Bridge,  
South Korea 
Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road, 
Philippines 
1. History/Time 
Frame/Indicative 
Timetable 
a. Private-Invested Incheon Bridge 
Activity 
• Mutual Understanding 
between Canadian and 
Korean Presidents 
• Establishment of KODA 
Development Co. (former 
name of Incheon Bridge Co. 
Ltd. (IBC) 
• Submission of Private-
Invested Project Proposal 
• Completion of the 
deliberation for the project 
proposal 
• Designation of preferred 
negotiation partner (AMEC) 
• Designation of 
concessionaire and signing 
of the Concession 
Agreement 
• Selection of design and 
2011 
• Pre-qualification conference 
• Publication of invitation to 
participate and bid 
• Submission of qualification 
documents 
• Notice of pre-qualification 
• Release of draft Concession 
Agreement to Pre-qualified 
Bidders 
• Pre-bid conference 
• Submission of technical and 
financial proposals 
2012 
• Issuance of Notice of Award 
• Signing of the Toll 
Concession Agreement 
• Approval of the detailed 
engineering design 
• Delivery of ROW 
• Start of construction 
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construction contractor 
(Samsung JV) 
• Signing of the Amended and 
Restated Concession 
Agreement  
• The ground-breaking 
ceremony (Ministry of 
Land, Transport and 
Maritime (MLTM) Affairs 
and Korea Expressway 
Corporation (KEC) 
• Completion of the project 
b. Government-Invested Connecting 
Road Project 
• Order of the construction 
project (MLTM     KEC) 
• Bidding for construction 
• Contract and the ground-
breaking ceremony 
Completion of the project 
 
2013 
• Construction 
2014 
• Completion of the project 
• Start of operations 
 
2. Construction Period Total:  June 2005 to October 2009 
(52 months or four years and four 
months) 
Targeted:  June 2011 to June 2014 
(36 months or three years) 
3. Length (Total) 21.38 km. (including embankment 
highway) 
Four km. 
4. Construction Cost  Total:  KRW2.450 billion (US$1.4 
billion) 
Estimated:  Php1.956 billion 
(US$47.413 million) 
5.  Project System Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
Turnkey Base 
BTO 
6. Project Implementing 
Agencies 
IBC (Concessionaire) and KEC 
(Representative of the Government) 
Ayala Corporation (Concessionaire) 
and the Department of Public Works 
and Highways (DPWH) 
(Representative of the Government) 
7. Operation Period by the 
Private Investor/ 
Concession Period 
30 years after the opening of the 
bridge 
25 years after opening of the road 
8. Toll Rates/Fees  Vehicle 
Class 
Per km. Total 
Vehicle  
Class 
Per km. Total 
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(subject to applicable 
toll fee exemptions and 
discounts) 
Sub-compact KRW128.62 
(US$0.12) 
KRW2,750 
(US$2.52) 
Not Applicable 
(NA) 
NA NA 
Compact KRW257.25 
(US$0.24) 
KRW5,500 
(US$5.04) 
Class 1 
(Private Cars) 
Php3.02 
(US$0.07) 
Php12.08 
(US$0.29) 
Mid-sized KRW439.66 
(US$0.40) 
KRW9,400 
(US$8.61) 
Class 2 
(Light Trucks) 
Php6.04 
(US$0.15) 
Php24.16 
(US$0.59) 
Large KRW565.95 
(US$0.52) 
KRW12,100 
(US$11.09) 
Class 3 
(Heavy Trucks) 
Php9.10 
(US$0.22) 
Php36.40 
(US$0.88) 
9. Quality  
(physical condition) 
Of excellent condition/well-
maintained/world-class (based on my 
own observation and assessment 
when I visited the bridge in August, 
2012) 
As of my last visit to the site in 
August, 2013, the road project is 
about 30% complete and is in good 
condition. (Please see pictures of the 
road project in its construction stage 
in the Appendix) 
 
 
VI-2. Overall Infrascope Scores of the Philippines and South Korea 
 
A. The Philippines 
 Using the Asia Infrascope as scoring guide, below is the evaluation for the Philippines:  
The Philippines has a long history with PPP projects and benefits from a good legal 
framework.  However, there is some institutional weakness and limitations on dispute-
resolution and financing. 
Table 3 
 
 The Asia Infrascope findings state that the overall legal framework is good, but there 
are no specific provisions for compensation.  Compensation is currently dealt with by the 
Government on a case-by-case basis.  Projects are selected first via the procuring government 
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unit, which develops an implementation plan that is then evaluated and, if approved, 
incorporated into a relevant development plan by the National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA).  NEDA’s Investment Coordination Committee is responsible for 
evaluation and final approval of projects and now presides over the old BOT Center (renamed 
the PPP Center).  The PPP Center does have expert staff, but high turnover has detracted 
from its effectiveness. 
 Moreover, the bidding process is well structured; in each case, the procuring agency 
must create a Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee composed of relevant experts, to 
invite, evaluate, and recommend bids.  Dispute-resolution, however, is a weak point, with 
loopholes in rules leading to ambiguity; disputes are usually left to parties to solve between 
themselves, although arbitration and the courts are occasionally used.  The courts themselves 
are not truly independent, although the situation is improving. 
 And finally, the current administration is also keen to attract foreign PPP partners, 
offering use of guarantees in some circumstances; however, political opposition to this policy 
does exist.  Generally, the Government’s ability to support projects is limited, owing to its 
poor fiscal position.  The bond market is also underdeveloped, reducing the possibility of 
finding adequate funding. 
 
B. South Korea 
 South Korea is among Asia-Pacific’s most highly-developed countries in terms of 
PPP.  The system is just and transparent, and the PPP body has highly-competent human 
resources.  Rotation among the government, however, is a concern. 
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Table 4 
The Asia Infrascope findings on South Korea’s PPP maintain that the bidding process 
is considered fair, and there are no single-bid contracts, as invitations are issued again if only 
one bidder emerges.  Currently, there are no PPP-specific dispute-resolution mechanisms, but 
private mediation firms, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman may offer mediation.  The 
MOSF has submitted a revision to the PPP Act to create a Dispute-Mediation Committee. 
 Furthermore, the score affirms that the PIMAC staff comprises trained engineers, 
accountants, lawyers, and project finance experts.  Unfortunately, however, MOSF staff are 
frequently rotated, and politicized hiring/firing is a problem; this may lead to a lack of 
consistency and knowledge.  Regarding risk-sharing, the standard concession agreement sets 
out how this will be divided, with case-by-case variations.  In the early days of the country’s 
PPP experience, the state was arguably too generous with minimum-revenue guarantees 
(MRG); the Incheon Airport Highway (1999) drew less than half the projected revenue, but 
the MRG meant that the government bore almost all the losses.  Since 2005, however, MRGs 
have been phased out.  Financial markets are relatively conducive to PPP financing, and 
politically, both main parties support PPPs. 
 And lastly, it asserts that at a local level, there is some concern that smaller regional 
authorities lack the capacity to handle PPPs. 
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VI-3. Comparison Based on Infrascope Framework 
 
 Based on the Infrascope Framework, the legal framework of South Korea is 
comprehensive and consistent across sectors and layers of government.  It addresses risk 
allocation and compensation issues in accordance with strict economic principles and enables 
sophisticated and consistent oversight of project implementation. 
 The Philippines, on the other hand, has a legal framework that is generally good and 
coherent, addressing risk-allocation issues, although it leaves some ambiguity with regard to 
compensation schemes and project implementation. 
 South Korea’s project selection and decision-making, is a consistent result a various 
efficiency, cost-benefit and social evaluation considerations required by law and 
accompanied by rigorous accounting practices. 
 In the Philippines, decision-making is both defined and used for PPP project decisions, 
although accounting for liabilities needs improvement for more consistent decisions. 
 Fair and transparent bidding procedures are established by regulations in South Korea, 
limits to renegotiations and adjustments are set, and independent oversight of post-award 
procedures is required. 
 Although project bidding is fair and transparent in the Philippines, renegotiations and 
expansions are regulated poorly. 
 In terms of quality of institutional design, in South Korea, (1) the necessary agencies 
operate and generally fulfill all necessary roles for sector oversight, although their structure 
and roles could be improved; (2) the judiciary consistently and effectively upholds contracts 
and allows for appeals to regulator rulings, ensures fair compensation for early termination 
and transfer of contracts, although delays occur and can generate hold-up risk. 
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 In the Philippines, (1) some agencies operate, but oversight is not comprehensive and 
agencies are highly prone to political distortion; (2) the judiciary occasionally upholds PPP 
operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, but in an inefficient manner. 
 In terms of operational maturity, agencies in South Korea generally have the 
necessary comprehensive project planning, design, and financing expertise and experience, 
exhibiting moderate service-quality oversight capacity; while in the Philippines, agencies 
have very limited project expertise and experience. 
 In the sub-national adjustment factor, an important and diverse concession program 
has been developed at a municipal or regional level in South Korea, and it benefits from a 
homogeneous framework, good local implementation-capacity, and institutional design.  A 
few successful examples of regional or municipal concessions exist in the Philippines, but 
capacity and projects at this level across the country are generally weak.  
 
 
VII. Discussion 
 
The Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road project is the first infrastructure development plan 
that the Aquino Administration has awarded under its flagship PPP scheme and is scheduled 
for completion by mid-2014.  The link road plan is projected to ease heavy traffic by 20 
minutes during off peak and by 60 minutes during peak hours per vehicle between Cavite and 
the Southern part of Luzon, which is considered to be among the fastest emerging section 
within Metro Manila where increase in the population, together with commercial and 
industrial advancement, has caused critical traffic blocking in the district.  Said reduction in 
travel time would mean savings on average fuel consumption by two km. per liter per vehicle.  
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Moreover, said link road project will also generate 2,672 jobs through direct employment and 
will promote wider inter-regional trade among regions using the facility. 
As part of President Benigno S. Aquino III’s social contract with the Filipino people, 
the PPP Center of the Philippines was established.  One of the most significant strategies of 
the PPP Center is its PPP Capacity Building Program, which is a comprehensive training 
service made available to National Government agencies and local government units aimed at 
building, enhancing and sustaining their institutional capabilities in all aspects of PPP project 
development and implementation throughout the whole PPP project cycle:  inception, 
planning and identification, project structuring, review and appraisal, approvals and 
procurement, project implementation and management, and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Figure 8. PPP Capacity Building Program in the Philippines 
This study firmly believes in the present Government’s vision of a Philippines that is 
able to achieve inclusive growth and is characterized by rapid, sustained, and broad-based 
economic growth that is focused on creating more jobs and new opportunities to achieve full 
employment, and on significantly reducing poverty. 
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The question arises, however, as to why I compared a relatively small road project to 
an upscale, world-class infrastructure project like the Incheon Bridge of South Korea.  And 
why choose PPP and not an old system of infrastructure development? 
The primary reason for choosing PPP over the old system of infrastructure 
development is because an infrastructure project involves a huge amount of money and 
resources, which may not be readily available.  Using PPP for infrastructure projects is much 
like buying an expensive appliance on installment.  You make a small down payment and 
immediately acquire the appliance which you would have otherwise taken a long time to save 
for considering your limited budget. 
I chose South Korea’s Incheon Bridge as a PPP benchmark project, because of the 
following reasons, among other things:  (1) the Infrascope Framework also listed South 
Korea as a benchmark country in terms of readiness and capacity; (2) it was designed by 
reputable agencies such as the ADB, and the EIU; (3) South Korea has a 15-year progressive 
PPP experience; (4) like the Philippines, South Korea uses BOT projects for ports, roads and 
bridges; and (5) South Korea is one of the top-performing Asia Pacific countries in terms of 
readiness and capacity to achieve sustainable, long-term PPP projects. 
In order to determine the status of the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road project, I 
interviewed officials and staff of the PPP Center of the Philippines, and the DPWH.  
According to them, as of 25 August 2013, the overall accomplishment of the Project is 
30.205% complete, which is ahead of schedule by 2.242%.            
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VIII. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 The success of the world-class Incheon Bridge project in South Korea has influenced 
my decision to come up with this paper in the hope of seeing this realized in my country in 
achieving sustainable implementation of PPP programs based on the Asian Infrascope 
Framework. 
 I realize that an infrastructure development project is a complex undertaking because 
it is large in scale; it requires a huge amount of financial resources; it demands a multi-
faceted portfolio of technologies and skilled human resources; and it is prone to market 
failure since the return on investment is very uncertain. 
 Having this in mind, I compared the Philippines’ ongoing PPP project, which is the 
Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road with South Korea’s well-accomplished PPP project, which is 
the Incheon Bridge in light of the Asia Infrascope Framework.   
 The Asia Infrascope developed by the ADB and EIU is a benchmark index and 
learning tool that assesses countries’ readiness and capacity for sustainable long-term PPP 
projects. 
 The result of the comparison made showed, among other things, that in overall 
Infrascope scores, South Korea had an overall index score of 71.3 and ranked third, while the 
Philippines attained a score of 47.1 and ranked eighth. 
 I believe that if a PPP project satisfies the Infrascope criteria, the more likely it is to 
become more sustainable than a PPP project that does not satisfy the framework.  A PPP 
project, like the Daang Hari-SLEx Link Road project has the potential to become a successful 
PPP project based on the analysis, observations and interviews conducted.  The link road 
project is then expected to yield positive outcomes in terms of public satisfaction, quality, 
financial returns, and regulatory/audit evaluations. 
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Furthermore, this study highly recommends that the Infrascope Framework be utilized 
as early as the planning stages of an infrastructure development project under PPP.  The said 
framework can also be considered as an effective monitoring tool for existing infrastructures.    
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